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In this paper, I shall provide a simple argument for the thirder analysis of the
usual version of Sleeping Beauty[4] and the hslfer analysis of a bare-bones version
of the scenario. This argument depends upon a calculation of relative frequencies
when the Sleeping Beauty experiment is repeated, but it is crucial that we be
dealing with independent repetitions of the same experiment. The versions of
repeated Sleeping Beauty discussed in the literature(for example[4, 1, 2]) violate
the independence requirement.
Sleeping Beauty[4] is the subject of an experiment. As a consequence of
the experiment, she is in a certain subjective psychological state S when she
wakes up on Monday and if a certain fair coin lands tails she is also in that
same state upon awakening on Tuesday. No one other than Beauty is ever in
state S and Beauty is never in state S except on one particular Monday if
the coin lands heads and one particular Monday and Tuesday if the coin lands
tails. Whenever she notices that she is in state S, Sleeping Beauty will want to
estimate the probability that the coin landed heads.
Beauty is assumed to be perfectly rational and to have perfect knowledge of
the protocol of the experiment. The question is what should be her estimate
for the probability that the coin landed heads. The two most popular answers
are one half[6] and one third[4].
The correct answer might depend on the details of the experimental protocol
and different versions of the Sleeping Beauty story have been discussed in the
literature. It should not matter if instead of being in the same exact state
S on Monday and Tuesday if the coin landed tails and the same exact state
S on Monday regardless of how the coin landed, she simply has no relevant
information available that could give her any clue as to whether it is Monday
and the coin landed heads or it is Monday and the coin landed tails or it is
Tuesday and the coin landed tails[3, 7]. The weather might be different on
Monday and Tuesday but that is useless information.
It might matter as Dorr points out[3] how long Beauty lives and how many
other people exist in the universe and how long they live. In the basic version
of the scenario, Beauty is the only person who has ever lived and she is only
alive and conscious for one short moment on Monday if the coin landed heads
or two short moments, one on Monday and one on Tuesday, if the coin landed
tails. For the basic version of the scenario, the halfer answer makes sense. In
what I shall call the standard version of the scenario, how the coin lands does
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not affect the total amount of conscious, at least minimally rational human life
in the universe, and Dorr would prefer the thirder answer. If how the coin lands
has only minimal effect on the total amount of conscious, at least minimally
rational human life in the universe, for example, because Beauty is asleep all
of Tuesday if and only if the coin lands tails but she lives a long life, then the
thirder answer might be considered approximately correct.
In the generalized Sleeping Beauty scenario, Beauty is in state S for M
moments if the coin lands heads and N moments if the coin lands tails. It is
intuitively clear that Beauty’s estimate for the probability that the coin landed
heads should not be affected by the value of M as long as NM = 2. But the ques-
tion still remains whether the halfer or thirder analysis is the correct analysis.
One might try to answer the question by computing relative frequencies
when the Sleeping Beauty experiment is repeated n times where n is very large.
Thus one might have n different coins tossed in n successive weeks. In any week
in which the coin lands heads, Beauty is in state S for one moment but she is
in the state S for two moments if the coin landed tails. In the basic version of
the scenario, Beauty is the only conscious life in the universe and she is only
conscious on days when she wakes up in state S. In the standard version of the
scenario, how the n coins land does not affect the total amount of conscious, at
least minimally rational human life in the universe. In both versions, whenever
she is in state S, Beauty needs to estimate the probability that the coin tossed
during the current week landed heads.
In either version of the repeated Beauty scenario, if n is large enough, it is
almost certain that the coin will land heads in approximately half the weeks
and thus there will be approximately twice as many S and tails moments as S
and heads moments. This seems to justify a thirder analysis.
The problem is that the n different experiments are not independent[5].
If i and j are different integers between 1 and n, then whether the current
moment is part of Monday of week i, part of Tuesday of week i or neither is not
independent of whether the current moment is part of Monday of week j, part
of Tuesday of week j or neither. Another reason to believe that we may not be
able to transfer our analysis from this repeated Sleeping Beauty scenario to the
unrepeated scenario is that the effect of a specific coin landing tails rather than
heads in repeated Sleeping Beauty is to multiply the total number of moments
during which Beauty is in state S by approximately 1.5n+.51.5n−.5 if n is large. But in
unrepeated Sleeping Beauty the effect is to multiply the total number of times
when Beauty is in state S by 2.
However, we can construct an independent repeated Sleeping Beauty sce-
nario whose analysis can be transferred to the unrepeated case. Our repeated
experiment will last 2n days if we are repeating basic Sleeping Beauty and Mn
days if we are repeating standard Sleeping Beauty. Here M should be a large
positive integer. In the basic version, we will represent a day as a sequence
of bits of length n; a bit can have the value 0 (Monday) or 1 (Tuesday). In
the standard version, we will represent a day as a sequence of length n of non-
negative integers. Each element of the sequence can be either 0 (Monday), 1
(Tuesday), or some number greater than 1 but less than M (some other day). In
2
both versions of our scenario, Beauty’s relevant psychological state will consist
of a sequence of n substates. For each integer between 1 and n, there is a special
substate Si. This special substate is a special possible value for the ith member
of the sequence of state representing Beauty’s psychological state.
In both versions of the scenario, Beauty’s psychological state is affected by
n independent tosses of fair coins. Beauty is in substate Si upon awakening on
day x if and only if either the ith element of the sequence x is equal to 0 or
the ith coin landed tails and the ith element of the sequence x is equal to 1. In
the basic version of the scenario, Beauty is unconsious except on days when she
wakes up in state (S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn). In the standard version of the scenario,
Beauty is conscious on all Mn days. For any i, whenever Beauty is in state Si,
she has to estimate the probability that the ith coin landed heads.
If n is large, then for both versions of the scenario, it is almost certain that
approximately half the coins landed heads. In the basic version of the scenario,
we could pick any day x during which Beauty is conscious and notice that for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Beauty wakes up in substate Si and approximately half of the i
are such that the coin landed heads.
In the standard version of the scenario, we examine a typical day represented
by the sequence x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn). If n is large enough approximately nM
of the xi will be equal to 0 and for these i, Beauty will awa in state Si. Of the
i such that xi = 0, approximately half are such that the ith coin landed heads
and half are such that it landed tails. But whenever xi = 0, Beauty awakens
in substate Si. Thus we have approximately n2M indexes i such that Beauty
is in state Si with the ith coin landing heads and xi = 0 (heads and Monday)
and approximately n2M indexes that are tails and Monday. The only other way
Beauty can be in state Si is if i is a tails and Tuesday index and there should
be approximately n2m of these indexes. Thus unless x is a very atypical day, the
number of i such that Beauty is in substate Si and the ith coin landed tails is
twice the number such that Beauty is in state Si and the coin landed tails. This
seems to justify the thirder analysis of unrepeates Sleeping Beauty and if M is
much larger than 2, the calculation would not be very different if we specified
in the standard scenario that Beauty is unconscious on any day x if for any
i, xi = 1 and the ith coin landed heads. (Beauty is unconscious on Tuesday
when the coin lands heads.) Thus our analysis also applies to a repetition of the
(n = 1) scenario where Beauty does not awaken on Tuesday if the coin landed
heads and Beauty lives a long life, much longer than two days.
I believe it should be clear why we are allowed to transfer our results from
independent repeated Sleeping Beauty to unrepeated Sleeping Beauty. Inde-
pendent repeated Sleeping Beauty really does involve independent repetitions
of unrepeated Sleeping Beauty. So we can (approximately) equate probabilities
in the unrepeated scenario to relative frequencies in the repeated version.
We really are repeating the same experiment. The only information that
Beauty has that is relevant to figuring out whether the ith coin has landed heads
or tails is the ith element of the sequence that represents her psychological state.
This follows from the independence of the different experiments. If i and j are
two positive integers between 1 and n, whatever estimate Beauty has for the
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ith coin landing heads given that she is in substate Si should be the same as
her estimate for the jth coin landing heads given that she is in substate Sj .
But if we ignore additional irrelevant information Beauty might have, Beauty’s
problem of estimating whether the ith coin landed heads in repeated Sleeping
Beauty is the same as her problem of estimating whether the one and only
relevant coin landed heads in unrepeated Sleeping Beauty. So we really are
repeating unrepeated Sleeping Beauty and the different experiments really are
independent.
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